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Abstract
On May 11, 2017, the Supreme Court of Florida held in Doe v. State that a judicial officer must
be physically present at hearings that involuntarily commit individuals to mental health facilities
pursuant to section 394.467 of the 2016 Florida Statutes, otherwise known as the Baker Act.
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INTRODUCTION

On May 11, 2017, the Supreme Court of Florida held in Doe v.
State1 that a judicial officer must be physically present at hearings that
involuntarily commit individuals to mental health facilities pursuant to
section 394.467 of the 2016 Florida Statutes,2 otherwise known as the Baker
Act.3 Fifteen mental health patients brought this case through their public
defenders in response to an email sent on behalf of a judge and magistrate
from Lee County, Florida, announcing that Baker Act hearings would be
held by teleconference from the courthouse, instead of in-person.4
Patient advocates and patients argued that holding Baker Act
hearings through teleconferences created a myriad of problems that violated
*
Clarisa Mondéjar earned her bachelor’s degree at the University of
Chicago, her master’s degree at the University of Miami, and continued her graduate studies
as a Ph.D. Candidate at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, before becoming a Juris
Doctoral Candidate at Nova Southeastern University’s Shepard Broad College of Law.
Clarisa would like to thank her mother for always providing her with constant guidance and
support. Clarisa also thanks her best friend, who inspired her to choose this topic and was
present in spirit as she wrote during the summer months of 2017. Lastly, Clarisa would like to
express her gratitude to all Nova Law Review members for their time, effort, and dedication
while editing this Comment.
1.
217 So. 3d 1020 (Fla. 2017).
2.
FLA. STAT. § 394.467 (2016). Throughout this paper, this statute will be
referred to as (“The Baker Act”) for uniformity.
3.
Doe, 217 So. 3d at 1022, 1032.
4.
Id. at 1023.
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patients’ procedural and substantive due process rights.5 These violations
would affect the fairness of these hearings and could create, or perpetuate,
abuses sought to be remedied by costly reforms that had been implemented
by the legislature since the late 1990s.6 Adversely, the respondents, judges,
and court personnel in favor of holding Baker Acts via teleconferences
argued that involuntary commitment is a civil process—as opposed to a
criminal process—which means that “no rule, statute, or constitutional
prohibition” exists banning the use of teleconferences in Baker Act
hearings.7 Respondents also argued that trial court judges had the discretion
to administer hearings, as they feel most appropriate and effective in the
absence of an express legal right or constitutional prohibition.8 The
respondents claimed—given the funding limitations of an already indebted
system—only conducting in-person Baker Act hearings was excessively
arduous, inefficient, and hindered patients’ treatment and reintroduction into
society.9 The use of teleconferences in Baker Act proceedings provides a
judge to work within a failing mental health reform system by limiting costs,
lessening wait time, improving services to the community, and increasing
efficiency in the rehabilitation and treatment of mental health patients.10
This Comment will examine the public policy and historical
development of the Baker Act,11 the debate over the Act’s constitutionality,
practicability, and the cost-benefits of the Baker Act’s community-based
treatment programs for the mentally ill.12 This Comment will also examine
calls to reform the Baker Act and the effectiveness of those reforms.13 Part
IV will analyze the practical and procedural repercussions of the holding in
Doe v. State that prohibited the use of teleconferencing in Baker Act
hearings.14 Finally, this Comment will conclude with recommendations that
acknowledge the legitimacy of the judges’ concerns within an underfunded,
short-sighted, reactionary—rather than proactive—mental health care
system.15

5.
Id. at 1026.
6.
See infra Parts IV–V.
7.
Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondent at 2, 4, Doe v. State, 217 So. 3d 1020 (Fla. 2017) (No. SC161852).
8.
Id. at 2.
9.
See id. at 9, 20.
10.
Id. at 9–10, 14–15.
11.
See infra Part I.
12.
See infra Parts I–II.
13.
See infra Parts II–III.
14.
See infra Part IV.
15.
See infra Part V.
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The Public Policy Behind the Baker Act

The Baker Act was named after State Representative Maxine Baker,
who served as chairperson on the House Committee on Mental Health in the
1960s and into the early 1970s.16 The Florida Legislature passed the act into
law as the Florida Mental Health Act in 1971.17 The Act was an overhaul
revision of the standing mental health laws that had been in existence for
ninety-seven years.18 The Baker Act came of age when government officials
began to consider patients’ civil rights and protect patients’ rights, while also
submitting to the necessity and authority of states’ parens patriae.19 The
intent was to provide mental health patients with the choice to voluntarily
seek treatment and to provide them with their constitutional rights to liberty
and due process.20
Before the Baker Act passed, the statutes governing mental illness
could place a patient into an institution for an undetermined amount of
time.21 Patients could easily be institutionalized into a state hospital
arbitrarily if “three people signed affidavits and secured the approval of a
county judge.”22 Children could be placed with adults in these institutions,
hospitals could request and require payments from the friends or families of
the patients, and patients were limited to corresponding with only one person
while institutionalized.23

16.
STATE OF FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES MENTAL HEALTH
PROGRAM OFFICE, HISTORY OF THE BAKER ACT: IT’S DEVELOPMENT & INTENT 1 (2002),
http://www.dcf.state.fl.us/programs/samh/mentalhealth/laws/histba.pdf; see also Jim Abbott,
Maxine E. Baker, Originator of State’s Baker Act, Dies, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Fla.), Feb. 1,
1994, at C3; MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM OFFICE & DEP’T OF MENTAL HEALTH LAW & POLICY,
2014 BAKER ACT USER REFERENCE GUIDE: THE FLA. MENTAL HEALTH ACT i, ix,
http://www.dcf.state.fl.us/programs/samh/mentalhealth/laws/BakerActManual.pdf.
17.
STATE OF FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES MENTAL HEALTH
PROGRAM OFFICE, supra note 16, at 1.
18.
Id.
19.
See id.; Parens Patriae, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
Black’s Law Dictionary defines parens patriae as the “state in its capacity as provider of
protection to those unable to care for themselves.” Parens Patriae, supra.
20.
STATE OF FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES MENTAL HEALTH
PROGRAM OFFICE, supra note 16, at 1; see also MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM OFFICE & DEP’T OF
MENTAL HEALTH LAW & POLICY, supra note 16, at 22 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 394.459)
(explaining that patients must be accorded individual dignity, and it provides that “[a] person
who is receiving treatment for mental illness shall not be deprived of any constitutional
rights.”).
21.
STATE OF FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES MENTAL HEALTH
PROGRAM OFFICE, supra note 16, at 1.
22.
Id.
23.
Id.
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Emblematic of the deprivations and abuses of the mental health
system in Florida before the Baker Act, is the United States Supreme Court
decision in O’Connor v. Donaldson.24 Respondent, Kenneth Donaldson,
brought his original action against J.B. O’Connor, the superintendent of the
Florida State Hospital at Chattahoochee in 1957.25 Donaldson was
institutionalized by his father, who believed he was suffering from
delusions.26 After a court proceeding in Pinellas County, Donaldson was
confined for fifteen years for care, maintenance, and treatment against his
will after he “was found to be suffering from paranoid schizophrenia.”27
Throughout the fifteen years, Donaldson repeatedly demanded his release
without success.28 While the superintendent denied Donaldson’s demands
and claimed it was because he was a danger to society, Donaldson stated that
the hospital was not providing him treatment for his illness.29 Testimony at
the trial court level provided no evidence that Donaldson posed a danger to
others while he was confined.30 Donaldson never showed he was suicidal or
thought of committing an injury against himself.31 Further, Donaldson’s
demands for relief were supported by responsible individuals who were
willing to care for him and help him after his release.32 Donaldson’s college
classmate, John Lembcke, wrote the superintendent requesting Donaldson’s
release, and stated he would take care of the patient, but was refused.33 Even
a representative of the Helping Hands, a halfway house, wrote on behalf of
Donaldson in 1963 and said they would take on his care upon release.34 The
Supreme Court stated that, at the trial level, “[t]he evidence showed that
Donaldson’s confinement was a simple regime of enforced custodial care,
not a program designed to alleviate or cure his supposed illness.”35
“O’Connor described Donaldson’s treatment as milieu therapy,” which the
24.
422 U.S. 563 (1975).
25.
Id. at 564.
26.
Id. at 565.
27.
Id. at 565–66. The Mayo Clinic defines paranoid schizophrenia as “a
severe mental disorder in which people interpret reality abnormally.” Schizophrenia, MAYO
CLINIC,
http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/schizophrenia/home/ovc20253194?p=1 (last visited Dec. 31, 2017). “Schizophrenia may result in some combination
of hallucinations, delusions, and extremely disordered thinking and behavior that impairs daily
functioning, and can be disabling.” Id. “Schizophrenia is a chronic condition, requiring
lifelong treatment.” Id.
28.
O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 565, 567–68.
29.
Id. at 565.
30.
Id. at 568.
31.
Id.
32.
Id. at 569.
33.
O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 569.
34.
Id. at 568.
35.
Id. at 569.
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hospital staff later described as a polite way of describing Donaldson’s
unstructured confinement within the hospital.36 Hospital staff confirmed that
his treatment consisted of being kept in a large room with sixty other
patients, including many who were criminally committed.37
B.

The Historical and Systematic Overhaul of the Mental Health
System: Deinstitutionalizing the Mentally Ill

As previously mentioned, the Baker Act was a product of an
evolving philosophy regarding the treatment of the mentally ill.38 Ninetyseven years came and went where mentally ill patients were locked up in
hospitals and watched over, as described in Donaldson’s case.39 Patients
who were perhaps arbitrarily institutionalized by friends, family, or doctors
could be placed with other patients who were ostensibly ill and those who
were criminally and homicidally insane.40 The mentally ill were not
considered patients who could be rehabilitated.41 Individualized treatment
with a goal of recovery was overlooked and, instead, public safety was
prioritized.42
Deinstitutionalization was introduced in the mid-1950s as a response
to an outcry by mental health advocates and politicians; they argued that
patients’ civil rights were being violated and that the system was both
ineffective and a heavy cost burden on the federal and state governments. 43
The primary goal of deinstitutionalization was to move treatment out of
commitments in hospitals and provide treatment through community-based
outpatient treatment centers.44 This movement gained steam because state
mental hospitals were extremely underfunded, outdated, and excessively
crowded.45 The Baker Act encourages patients to voluntarily admit
36.
Id.
37.
Id.
38.
See STATE OF FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES MENTAL HEALTH
PROGRAM OFFICE, supra note 16, at 1, 3.
39.
See id. at 1.
40.
See Jennifer Gutterman, Note, Waging a War on Drugs: Administering a
Lethal Dose to Kendra’s Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2401, 2405 (2000); STATE OF FLA. DEP’T
OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM OFFICE, supra note 16, at 1.
41.
Cristina Bianchi, America’s Mental Health System: Closing the Revolving
Door Between Hospitals, Correctional Facilities & the Streets, 28 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 99,
102 (2015).
42.
See Gutterman, supra note 40, at 2402.
43.
Steven Strang, Note, Assisted Outpatient Treatment in Ohio: Is Jason’s
Law Life-Saving Legislation or a Rash Response?, 19 HEALTH MATRIX: J.L. MED. 247, 250–
51 (2009); see also Bianchi, supra note 41, at 102–03.
44.
Gutterman, supra note 40, at 2406–07; Strang, supra note 43, at 250–51.
45.
Gutterman, supra note 40, at 2407; Strang, supra note 43, at 251.
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themselves into psychiatric care if they are competent, but also allows
individuals to be involuntarily committed and examined if specific criteria
are met.46 The revolution of new medications and newly created monetary
incentives by the federal government also promoted this shift.47
In 1955, Smith, Kline, and French Laboratories developed the first
antipsychotic medication to land on the market, Thorazine.48 Before the
introduction of Thorazine, the treatment of diseases, “such as schizophrenia,
[was] long-term confinement” because no medication proved effective.49
Thorazine led to mentally ill patients being prone to less violent episodes
because it relieved mental health symptoms, such as psychosis, delusion,
paranoia, hallucinations, and irritability.50 Mentally ill patients were now
considered capable of being reintroduced and integrated into society because
there was a possibility they could function within their communities.51 In
that year, an estimated 560,000 mentally ill patients from state-run hospitals
were released with no follow-up care provided.52 These new medicines,
coupled with the political environment of the 1960s and its specific focus on
civil rights, provided patients a voice.53 Concerns grew throughout the
mental health community that patients’ rights to seek and refuse treatment
were being violated.54
But the most effective and influential push away from
institutionalization of mental health patients towards deinstitutionalization
came in 1965.55 The federal government began Medicaid in 1965 and
hospitals could receive payments from patients who had Medicaid.56
However, hospitals realized that discharging mentally ill patients had
monetary benefits because patients institutionalized in state psychiatric
46.
FLA. STAT. § 394.467(1)–(2) (2016); STATE OF FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN &
FAMILIES MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM OFFICE, BAKER ACT INVOLUNTARY EXAMINATION:
CRITERIA,
PROCESSES
AND
TIMEFRAMES
1
(2002),
http://www.dcf.state.fl.us/programs/samh/MentalHealth/laws/bainvex.pdf.
47.
See Bianchi, supra note 41, at 103–04; Gutterman, supra note 40, at 2406;
Strang, supra note 43, at 251.
48.
Strang, supra note 43, at 250.
49.
Id.
50.
Id.
51.
Id. at 250–51.
52.
Bianchi, supra note 41, at 103.
53.
See Gutterman, supra note 40, at 2406–07; Strang, supra note 43, at 251.
54.
Strang, supra note 43, at 251.
55.
See Ilissa L. Watnik, Comment, A Constitutional Analysis of Kendra’s
Law: New York’s Solution for Treatment of the Chronically Mentally Ill, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
1181, 1184–85 (2001) (explaining that Thorazine is also known as chlorpromazine); Bianchi,
supra note 41, at 103–04; Candice T. Player, Involuntary Outpatient Commitment: The Limits
of Prevention, 26 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 159, 168 (2015).
56.
See Watnik, supra note 55, at 1184–85.
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hospitals were excluded from the Medicaid payment system. 57 This was not
an accidental outcome of the changes made to mental health laws and its
funding made by the legislature; excluding mentally ill patients from the
Medicaid payment system was done to shift the burden and costs of
individualized medical care for patients from the federal government to the
individual states.58 By discharging patients out of state hospitals and into
community-based treatment programs, the states were able to receive
Medicaid reimbursements.59
The Supreme Court’s Historical Declarations Regarding the
C.
Constitutionality of the Baker Act and the Current Law
Florida does not specifically prohibit the use of teleconferencing to
conduct Baker Act hearings.60 However, the use of teleconferences during
these proceedings arguably works in direct opposition to case law precedent
that aims to ensure that the mentally ill are provided their constitutional right
of liberty when not dangerous to themselves or others.61 In order to commit
an individual under the Baker Act to a state mental health facility, the State
must prove specific criteria.62 When met, this criteria shows that the
57.
Id.
58.
See id.
59.
E. Fuller Torrey, Homelessness, Incarceration, Episodes of Violence:
Way of Life for Almost Half of Americans with Untreated Schizophrenia and Bipolar, MENTAL
ILLNESS POL’Y ORG., http://www.mentalillnesspolicy.org/consequences/consequences-2.html
(last visited Dec. 31, 2017); see also Bianchi, supra note 41, at 104 n.38.
60.
See FLA. STAT. § 394.467(6)(a)(2) (2016); Doe v. State, 210 So. 3d 154,
157 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2016), rev’d, 217 So. 3d 1020 (Fla. 2017); Brief for the Chief
Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7,
at 5.
61.
FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, INVOLUNTARY INPATIENT
PLACEMENT
9
(2008),
http://www.dcf.state.fl.us/programs/samh/mentalhealth/laws/involinpplac0809.pdf; cf. In re
Beverly, 342 So. 2d 481, 489 (Fla. 1977).
62.
FLA. STAT. § 394.467(1). To commit a patient involuntarily into inpatient
mental health facilities, the finding of the court must meet the following criteria by clear and
convincing evidence:
(a) He or she has a mental illness and because of his or her mental illness:
1.a. He or she has refused voluntary inpatient placement for treatment after
sufficient and conscientious explanation and disclosure of the purpose of inpatient
placement for treatment; or
b. He or she is unable to determine for himself or herself whether inpatient
placement is necessary; and
2.a. He or she is incapable of surviving alone or with the help of willing and
responsible family or friends, including available alternative services, and, without
treatment, is likely to suffer from neglect or refuse to care for himself or herself,
and such neglect or refusal poses a real and present threat of substantial harm to his
or her well-being; or

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol42/iss1/6

8

Monde'jar: The Practical And Procedural Repercussions of Short-Sighted, Unde

2017]

THE PRACTICAL AND PROCEDURAL REPERCUSSIONS

147

individual is incapable of surviving alone, or that there is significant cause to
believe that the individual would inflict serious bodily harm upon himself,
and all less restrictive means and treatment alternatives were judged
inappropriate.63 This is because once the patient is involuntarily committed,
he or she is deprived of his or her liberty as provided by the Due Process
Clause of the Constitution.64
D.
The 1970s: Establishing a “Clear and Convincing Evidence”
Standard to Involuntarily Commit Patients
In the 1970s, Florida courts were preoccupied with determining the
burden of proof necessary to involuntarily commit a mentally ill patient and
were also concerned with validating the constitutionality of depriving private
citizens of their liberty while they were in such vulnerable health states.65 A
patient can be involuntarily committed through a showing of clear and
convincing evidence that they meet the requirements as set forth in the Baker
Act.66 In 1977, in In re Beverly,67 the Supreme Court of Florida held that
given that the standard of proof of civil commitment hearings was clear and
convincing evidence, the Baker Act was not unconstitutionally overbroad or
vague, as long as all the elements of the Baker Act were met by the burden of
proof described by the court.68 Strict adherence to the rules was imperative
given the serious nature of the deprivation of liberty.69 The balance between
state interests and the individual’s interest70 must be constantly evaluated and
b. There is substantial likelihood that in the near future he or she will inflict serious
bodily harm on self or others, as evidenced by recent behavior causing, attempting,
or threatening such harm; and
(b) All available less restrictive treatment alternatives that would offer an
opportunity for improvement of his or her condition have been judged to be
inappropriate.

Id.
63.
Id.
64.
U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1; see also FLA. STAT. § 394.467(1); Brief
for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent,
supra note 7, at 4; MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM OFFICE & DEP’T OF MENTAL HEALTH LAW &
POLICY, supra note 16, at ix.
65.
See In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d at 488–90 (Fla. 1977); STATE OF FLA. DEP’T
OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM OFFICE, supra note 16, at 1.
66.
FLA. STAT. § 394.467(1)(a)–(b).
67.
342 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1977).
68.
See id. at 486, 490.
69.
Id. at 489.
70.
Id. at 489–90. The state’s interest is to protect society from individuals
who are dangerous either to themselves or to others, while protecting the individual interest
pertains to providing individuals with their basic constitutional right of freedom without the
undue imposition of a state’s governmental restraints. Id.
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weighed.71 Neff v. State72 reiterated what the Donaldson case had already
established and held that in Florida, if an individual is mentally ill and unable
to recognize their illness, they still cannot be held against their will if they
are considered non-dangerous, capable of caring for themselves, and
ultimately able to survive despite their mental illness without help.73
E.
The 1980s and 1990s: Explicit Examinations to Determine, Caseby-Case, if Involuntary Commitment Is Necessary
By the 1980s and into the 1990s, Florida courts began to define caseby-case what clear and convincing evidence meant regarding the elements of
the Baker Act.74 They also began defining on a case-by-case basis whether
involuntary commitment was the appropriate and least restrictive measure
needed by the patient to meet his or her needs while ensuring the safety of
the public.75 Schexnayder v. State76 held that, even if a person was severely
mentally ill, the state would not meet the clear and convincing burden of
proof if a person had a place to live, had financial resources, and had
knowledge they needed medication but would periodically forget their
medication, which often led to the patient’s hospitalization.77 Despite the
patient’s mood changes and hospitalizations, the court held that these
instances did not show clear and convincing evidence that she was dangerous
to herself or the public or that these events led to substantial harm to her
well-being.78
The Everett v. State79 case, in 1988, demonstrated the incredible and
detrimental impact an incorrectly imposed court order of involuntary
commitment against an individual can have on the liberty rights of that
patient within the Baker Act system.80 The patient appealed the finding by
the circuit court that held that she be involuntarily committed at a treatment
facility to the First District Court of Appeal.81 The First District Court of
71.
72.
73.

In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d at 489–90.
356 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975); Neff, 356 So. 2d at

903.
74.
Everett v. State, 524 So. 2d 1091, 1092 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988)
(citing Schexnayder v. State, 495 So. 2d 850, 851–52 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1986)); see also
Welk v. State, 542 So. 2d 1343, 1344–45 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
75.
See Burley v. State, 59 So. 3d 131, 134 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
76.
495 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
77.
Id. at 851–52.
78.
Id.
79.
524 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
80.
See id. at 1092–93.
81.
Id. at 1092.
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Appeal reversed the decision of the circuit court because it found that the
State did not provide evidence that showed involuntary placement was
necessary and that she refused voluntary placement for mental health
treatment.82 The devastating result in this case was that the appeal process
endured beyond the original court order and, when the original court order
expired, she had already been ordered to continue her involuntary
placement.83 While the district court agreed that the State had not met its
burden of proof in the original hearing, the order for continuing involuntary
placement was not automatically considered null and void.84 Further, the
patient’s liberty and time spent involuntarily committed while waiting for the
appeal to be heard by the court could not be undone or recovered.85
Welk v. State86 established that if there is insufficient evidence to
show that a person poses real and current harm to themselves or others, then
involuntary commitment is not justified even if an expert testifies that
without supervision problems with the mentally ill patient will continue to
arise.87 The Fifth District Court of Appeal held in Hedrick v. Florida
Hospital Medical Center88 that even if the State can prove that the patient
shows potential for poor judgment, without the evidence of a present and
current threat to substantially harm himself or herself or someone else, the
statutory test of clear and convincing evidence was not met.89 Conclusory
statements that a patient had potential to cause substantial harm to himself
and a potential for aggression did not meet the clear and convincing evidence
standard to substantiate a court ordered continued involuntary placement
under the Baker Act.90 Even the testimony of a psychologist stating that a
patient should be institutionalized through the Baker Act—because she was
incapable of taking care of herself and surviving alone, and would cause her
own suffering through neglect and a refusal to take care of herself—did not
pass the clear and convincing evidence standard according to the First
District Court of Appeal in the Archer v. State91 case.92 The test was not met
because the psychologist conceded that the patient had not threatened to hurt

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
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Everett, 524 So. 2d. at 1092–93.
See id.
542 So. 2d 1343 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
See id. at 1344–45.
633 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
Id. at 1153–54.
See id.
681 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
Id. at 300–01.
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herself or others, and the patient testified that she would take her
medication.93
To this end, the First District Court of Appeal in Lyon v. State,94 held
that a schizophrenic woman, who refused to care for herself and was “likely
to suffer from neglect,” did not show signs of a “real [or] present threat of
substantial harm” to herself or anyone else and did not meet the requirements
of involuntary commitment under the Baker Act.95 In this case, a doctor
stated that the woman would become incoherent in her speech, would be
unable to take care of herself, and would need supervision and structure
when and if she did not take her medications.96 Still, despite these
statements in the trial court hearing, the appellate court reversed the
involuntary commitment order and found that the trial court’s holding did not
meet the clear and convincing evidence burden.97 In Adams v. State,98 a
petition for the involuntary placement of a patient for treatment was not
granted because it did not meet the clear and convincing evidence burden,
since a witness mentioned in the original Baker Act petition was not present
at the hearing.99 This highlighted the ever-important issue of ensuring that
the liberty of a patient is not deprived, without confirmation that all
information and facts within the petition are confirmed by the judge, and
rendered presently clear and convincing that the patient meets all the Baker
Act requirements.100
F.
The Role of Teleconferences in Baker Act Hearings: State’s Interests
Versus Mental Health Patients’ Constitutional Rights
Historically, there are court proceedings that occur by video, such as
arraignments.101 On November 12, 1998, video hearings were suggested as a
means for involuntary commitment hearings to be held in a more convenient
and cost-effective manner.102 While some judges commented that the
videoconferences would lessen the need for patients to be transported to the
courthouse, other mental health professionals pointed out several issues
regarding mental health patients being provided their court hearings through

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 301.
724 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (per curiam).
Id. at 1241–42; see also FLA. STAT. § 394.467 (2016).
Lyon, 724 So. 2d at 1242.
Id. at 1243.
713 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
See id. at 1063–64.
See id.
FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, supra note 61, at 9.
Id.
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videoconferences.103 Many mental health patients suffer from paranoia and
will react negatively to video hearings.104 Mental health patients can be
confused and unable to understand that the videoconference was a formal
court hearing.105 Representatives from the Mental Health Program Office of
the Department of Children and Families were concerned that the use of
videos to conduct court hearings would deter mental health patients from
participating in their involuntary placement proceedings.106 Judge Winifred
Sharp, from the Fifth District Court of Appeal, admitted that it would be
difficult to make a video proceeding feel like a formal court hearing, making
it more difficult to ensure that a patient understands the proceeding was a
formalized court proceeding which determines stakes as serious as their
liberty and possible involuntary commitment.107 While the legislature never
enacted the recommendations of the Supreme Court Commission, the
Commission did recommend that to improve administrative justice during
Baker Act hearings the use of videoconferences for involuntary placement
hearings should not be used.108
The Supreme Court of Florida cited to Ibur v. State,109 which stated,
“[b]ecause involuntary commitment is a substantial deprivation of liberty at
which fundamental due process protections must attach, the patient cannot be
denied the right to be present, to be represented by counsel, and to be
heard.”110
Part of the specified criteria in the Baker Act is that an evidentiary
hearing must be conducted for involuntary inpatient treatment.111 The court
must also conduct the hearing within five court-working-days, except for
when a continuance is granted.112 And unless otherwise represented, the
individual will be appointed a public defender by the court within one courtworking-day.113 The Baker Act requires that, unless for good cause, the
hearing would be held in the county or facility where the patient was located,
as deemed appropriate.114 The hearing would need to be “convenient [for]
the patient [and] consistent with orderly procedure,” and would need to be in
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

See id.
See id.
See id.
FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, supra note 61, at 9.
Id.
Id.
765 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Doe v. State, 217 So. 3d 1020, 1026 (Fla. 2017) (quoting Ibur, 765 So. 2d

111.
112.
113.
114.

FLA. STAT. § 394.467(2), (6) (2016).
Id. § 394.467(6)(a)1.
Id. § 394.467(4).
Id. § 394.467(6)(a)2.

at 276).
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a physical setting that is not dangerous to the patient’s condition.115
Magistrates, along with judges, are allowed to preside over these hearings.116
These procedural safeguards were established by the legislature to
protect and recognize that individuals who fell under the auspices of the
Baker Act were some of “the most vulnerable individuals of . . . society.”117
No doubt, the safeguard spelling out that hearings must be held by judges
physically present was not in the statute.118
II.

RECIDIVISM AND THE PUSH FOR REFORM

Before twenty years had passed since the Baker Act’s initial
implementation, calls for reform were prevalent throughout Florida.119
Reformers and civilians alike began to question the effectiveness of the
Baker Act system at providing patients with treatment without depriving
them of their constitutional rights.120 In many cases, mentally ill patients
could not recognize they were ill and needed services.121 The Baker Act’s
aim was to promote families and patients to voluntarily seek help at
outpatient community centers, yet patients consistently lacked the insight to
know they were ill.122 The Baker Act was originally drafted to authorize law
enforcement officers and agents to provide emergency services through
115.
Id.
116.
FLA. STAT. § 394.467(6)(a)3.
117.
Doe v. State, 217 So. 3d 1020, 1025 (Fla. 2017).
118.
Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 394.467.
119.
FLA. STAT. § 394.467; see also STATE OF FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN &
FAMILIES MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM OFFICE, supra note 16, at 2; Mark D. Killian, Fairness
Commission Says Baker Act Is in Need of an Overhaul, FLA. B. NEWS (Feb. 1, 2000),
http://www.floridabar.org/news/tfbnews/?durl=%2FDIVCOM%2FJN%2Fjnnews01.nsf%2FArticles%2FD7ADEF93C0A14EE7
85256B1100775780; South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, Baker Act Reform: Protect
the Vulnerable with Changes in Law, SUN-SENTINEL (Feb. 18, 2004), http://www.sunsentinel.com/opinion/sfl-edittdmental4feb18-story.html.
120.
See Killian, supra note 119 (explaining that in the 1990s, while the law
required a Baker Act hearing to occur within four to five days after the initial seventy-twohour involuntary commitment time had passed and a petition was filed, only 40–50% of Baker
Act hearings would occur within that time frame). Thus, 50–60% of Baker Act hearings were
not occurring within the statutory time frame, and individuals were being effectively held
against their will without committing a crime and without recourse to combat their
detainment. Id. Hence, these individuals were denied their constitutional right to due process
during this time. See id.
121.
See South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, supra note 119.
122.
Paul F. Stavis, The Nexum: A Modest Proposal for Self-Guardianship by
Contract: A System of Advance Directives and Surrogate Committees-at-Large for the
Intermittently Mentally Ill, 16 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 21–22 (1999); see also
STATE OF FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM OFFICE, supra note
16, at 1.
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inpatient involuntary commitments to stabilize persons dangerous to
themselves or others for only seventy-two hours.123 These two elements
combined led to individuals being repeatedly involuntarily committed.124
From 1965 until 1995, involuntary commitments increased dramatically,125
and in 2002, over 900 Florida adult patients were admitted to hospitals
through the Baker Act over four times.126 In one extreme case, a patient
received forty-one examinations, and cost the State of Florida in excess of
$81,000.127
Reforms attempting to overhaul the Baker Act in 1996 and 1999 did
not rid Florida’s Mental Health system of the constitutional abuses against
patients.128 The overhaul, from as recently as 1996, attempted to lessen
inappropriate commitments, such as vulnerable elderly individuals who were
committed despite not needing psychiatric treatment.129 These abuses
continued because patients became vulnerable once they were placed in the
seventy-two hour hold and unable to voluntarily make any decisions until
either released from the hospital or released by a judge.130 Further, while the
law guarantees that involuntary commitment will be imposed upon an
individual when all other methods are exhausted and the commitment is
considered the least restrictive means for that patient to receive help, the
definition of least restrictive is in itself up for interpretation.131 Receiving
facilities and hospitals are allowed to hold a patient for seventy-two hours if
the patient meets the involuntary commitment criteria.132 However, they
may also ask a judge to allow them to hold a patient for longer periods if the
facility feels that the person is a harm to themselves or others.133 In these

123.
South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, supra note 119.
124.
See id.
125.
See Torrey, supra note 59.
126.
South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, supra note 119.
127.
Id.
128.
See Jonathan Abel, Police Resort to Baker Act for a 7-Year-Old’s
Tantrum, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Fla.), Feb. 14, 2009, at 1B; Carol Marbin Miller, Locked in
Hospital, Woman Caught in Baker Act Fight, MIAMI HERALD: MIAMI-DADE CTY. (Aug. 18,
2015,
9:05
PM),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miamidade/article31483943.html.
129.
Miller, supra note 128.
130.
Id.; see also STATE OF FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES MENTAL
HEALTH PROGRAM OFFICE, supra note 46, at 3.
131.
See Miller, supra note 128; South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board,
supra note 119.
132.
Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 394.467(1)–(2) (2016) (referring to the criteria a
patient must meet by clear and convincing evidence in order to be involuntarily committed
under the Baker Act).
133.
Miller, supra note 128.
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instances, the facility receives Medicaid money to cover the cost of
treatment—putting a price tag on each Baker Act patient’s head.134
A.
Unfunded and Short-Sighted Reforms Lead to a Resurgence of Old
Abuses and Re-Institutionalization via Criminalization and Incarceration
In 1997, the Supreme Court of Florida Commission on Fairness
organized and evaluated whether the 1970s Baker Act was providing
treatment, access, and opportunities to participate and receive services
through the state court system in an equal manner.135 The chair of the
Commission was Eleventh Circuit Judge Gill S. Freeman, and she wrote that
Florida “failed to develop . . . adequate . . . community programs [that met]
the needs of its people.”136 In 1997, the Commission reported that over half
a million people in the State of Florida suffered from mental illness—more
than 300,000 from Alzheimer’s; that “more than 70,000 [people] were
involuntarily examined [by] the Baker Act;” and close to “20,000 petitions
for involuntary civil commitment [were filed requesting] psychiatric
treatment.”137 The Commission focused on the idea that inadequate funding
was the main problem in meeting the goals and purpose described by the
1970s Baker Act.138 The system was slowed down and, as a result,
detentions in involuntary civil commitments became lengthier, and abuses
began to increase because monetary gains could be achieved by holding
individuals for longer than necessary, especially with regard to the elderly. 139
“[T]he tension between fiscally driven policy and clinically desirable
outcomes” has been named the key cause of these issues.140 The switch from
treating mentally ill patients with federally funded money to providing them
treatment through state-funded programs has caused a major shift in how
treatment is provided to patients and what patients qualify for state-funded
help.141
134.
Id.; see also Killian, supra note 119.
135.
See Killian, supra note 119.
136.
Id.
137.
Id.
138.
See id.
139.
See id.
140.
Jeffrey L. Gellar, Excluding Institutions for Mental Diseases from Federal
Reimbursement for Services: Strategy or Tragedy?, 51 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1397, 1397
(2000).
141.
See id. at 1399; Derek Gilliam, Panel Looks at Mental Health Reform;
Proper Treatment and Funding Could Help Many More in Need, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Jan. 30,
2015, at B8 (explaining that this tension in 2015 was a result of Medicare only reimbursing
60% of treatment provided to patients who qualified for Medicare funds, and the lack of funds
coupled with a “lack of uniformity [between] mental health courts, . . . a shortage of
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Other major issues that the Commission cited as to why the Baker
Act needed reform were: (1) time frames were not defined and up to
interpretation—five days could mean “five working days or five consecutive
days;” (2) no due process was afforded to a patient until the court hearing
occurred; (3) “justice system participants [were] not always . . . trained on
[the] mental health issues” they were either representing or making
judgments; (4) almost exclusively, mental health patients were only
represented by public defenders; (5) the quality of representation was not
uniform, despite most being represented by their county’s public defender
office; (6) resources to public defenders were not uniform; (7)
communication about the priority which these cases were to take in public
defender offices was not uniform; (8) compliance by state attorneys’ offices
to represent and participate at every involuntary commitment hearing did not
always occur, leading to the release of dangerous patients; (9) law
enforcement officials and agencies lacked training on mental health as well;
and (10) persons were, and could be, involuntarily committed because of the
vindictiveness of an enraged spouse or neighbor given some officials were
not trained properly.142 Beyond these issues cited by the Commission, the
deinstitutionalized system depended on patients who lacked self-recognition
and insight by mental health patients that they were sick and needed help.143
Mental health advocates argued that as the system stood in 2004, a
reform was needed because the system “deinstitutionaliz[ed] . . . persons
with mental illness [away] from . . . mental health hospitals” and, ultimately,
led them to “their re-institutionalization [within] the criminal justice
system.”144 In 1992, a Public Citizen Survey found that sometimes
individuals with no charges against them are incarcerated because they are
waiting for a psychiatric evaluation, a hospital bed, or transportation to the
hospital.145 One sheriff in Florida stated, “I have had mentally ill inmates in
paper gowns in holding cells for close observation for up to six weeks before
we could find a hospital bed for them.”146

psychiatrists, and [a] need for flexible spending” created a system that was constantly in
turmoil).
142.
Killian, supra note 119.
143.
Id.; see also Stavis, supra note 122, at 21–22.
144.
Fla. H.R. Comm. on Mental Health, HB 463 (2004) Staff Analysis 6 (Apr.
1, 2004); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EMERGING JUDICIAL STRATEGIES FOR THE MENTALLY
ILL IN THE CRIMINAL CASELOAD: MENTAL HEALTH COURTS IN FORT LAUDERDALE, SEATTLE,
SAN
BERNADINO,
AND
ANCHORAGE
2,
10
(2000),
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/182504.pdf.
145.
E. FULLER TORREY, OUT OF THE SHADOWS: CONFRONTING AMERICA’S
MENTAL ILLNESS CRISIS 37 (1997).
146.
Id.
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B.
The Disastrous Failures of Deinstitutionalization and the Move to
Implement New Reforms in 2004
In July 1998, forty-three year old Alan Singletary of Seminole
County, Florida, killed Deputy Eugene Gregory after a thirteen-hour standoff
ensued over a simple landlord-tenant dispute.147 Singletary had untreated
schizophrenia, and his family had sought help for him for years without
success.148 The landlord-tenant dispute quickly plummeted into a confusing
and unsettling “standoff between Singletary, Seminole [Florida] Sheriff’s
deputies, and SWAT team members.”149 Ultimately, Singletary died after
killing Deputy Gregory and wounding two other law enforcement officers.150
Politicians and law enforcement agents would state that this incident was
emblematic of a growing “law enforcement and humanitarian issue”
regarding the treatment of mentally ill patients.151 While Florida was
considered a pioneer in mental health law, heavy burdens induced upon law
enforcement, the court system, and hospital crisis units made the
practicalities of enforcing the 1971 Baker Act exceedingly difficult.152
Loopholes in implementing the law existed and continuing care was not
provided.153 If an inpatient bed was not readily available, that patient was
released, and the continued care they needed was not always provided.154
By 2004, a call for Baker Act reform headed by Seminole County
Sheriff Don Eslinger, made it to the State Legislature calling for sustained
outpatient commitment orders combined with intensive mental health
services.155 On the session’s last day, a major rewrite of the Baker Act was
instituted.156 The reform was enacted into law by Governor Jeb Bush in
2004.157 The push was to begin to enact reforms; to create avenues which
147.
In Memoriam…, CATALYST: SPECIAL FLA. EDITION (Treatment Advocacy
Ctr., Arlington, Va.), Summer 2004, at 9.
148.
Id.
149.
Id.
150.
Id.
151.
Jan Pudlow, Baker Act Rewrite Calls for Outpatient Treatment, FLA. B.
NEWS, June 1, 2004, at 7.
152.
Lilac, Editorial, Sensible Help; Our Position: Continuing Treatment
Should Be Required for Violent Mental Patients., ORLANDO SENTINEL (Fla.), Jan. 25, 2004, at
G2; see also FLA. STAT. § 394.467 (2016); In Memoriam..., supra note 147, at 9; Killian,
supra note 119.
153.
Lilac, supra note 152; see also In Memoriam…, supra note 147, at 9.
154.
TORREY, supra note 145, at 10; Lilac, supra note 152.
155.
See Pudlow, supra note 151.
156.
Id.
157.
New Help, New Hope, in Florida, CATALYST: SPECIAL FLA. EDITION,
(Treatment Advoc. Ctr., Arlington, Va.), Summer 2004, at 1; see also FLA. STAT. § 394.467
(2016).
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provide mental health patients with the resources they need—while keeping
the public safe: to not create confusion in an underfunded mental health
system; and to not overburden the court system.158 Mental health advocates
believed that people with serious mental illness could avoid hospitalization if
they received early interventions and treatments that were appropriate before
their mental health deteriorated.159
Mental health advocates began to look at other states’ mental health
systems and eventually fixated on New York’s Kendra’s Law.160 The law in
New York authorized court ordered assisted outpatient treatment to
individuals with mental illness.161 Kendra’s Law, developed after a man
with severe mental illness who was unable to comply with doctor’s orders
and medical prescriptions, pushed thirty-two-year-old Kendra Webdale into a
New York City subway train and killed her.162 Many Baker Act reforms
were passed in 2004, intending to solve the problems that were discussed
above.163 However, the amount allotted to institute these reforms was
devastatingly under the estimated $150 million needed to institute Kendra’s
Law in its first five years.164 Citing only to a 25% government match and
one additional administrator at each mental health location to input
additional data, the bill only loosely defined its financial terms and
reforms.165
Judges and other legal personnel in Florida’s criminal system argued
that persons with mental illness often committed misdemeanors and would
cycle in and out of county jails.166 This was attributed by judges and legal
professionals in the criminal legal community as resulting from persons with
mental illness not being diagnosed correctly; the lack of management of
mental health patients outside inpatient facilities, and that for some
individuals treatment only occurred when in jail, but was discontinued, along
with their use of medications, once released from imprisonment.167 Some
even argued that the newest rewrite of the Baker Act would save money by

158.
159.

See Pudlow, supra note 151.
Fla. H.R. Comm. on Mental Health, HB 463 (2004) Staff Analysis 6 (Apr.

1, 2004).
160.
See South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, supra note 119.
161.
Id.
162.
Id.
163.
Id.; see also Fla. H.R. Comm. on Mental Health, HB 463 (2004) Staff
Analysis 1.
164.
See Fla. H.R. Comm. On Mental Health, HB 463 (2004) Staff Analysis
12; South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, supra note 119.
165.
Fla. H.R. Comm. On Mental Health, HB 463 (2004) Staff Analysis 12–13.
166.
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 144, at 9.
167.
Fla. H.R. Comm. on Mental Health, HB 463 (2004) Staff Analysis 6.
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keeping patients out of a revolving door of expensive hospitals and jails.168
While others predicted oppositely and believed that the legislation that came
with no funding would, in fact, overburden courts and create confusion; and
the workload cost, while not determined, would undoubtedly be excessive.169
The legislation was deemed by many as a mandate without resources, both in
physical and monetary support.170 Even the House of Representatives’ Staff
Analysis Report stated that HB 463 would create a recurring fiscal impact,
but only estimated the impact to be at $636,608 to $954,912.171
Given that the laws put into place in 2004 were modeled after New
York’s Kendra’s Law, the recurring estimated amount to fund SB 700/HB
463 was grossly underestimated over the actual cost of $150 million to
institute Kendra’s Law in New York.172 The $150 million was only allotted
to pay for the first five years of its implementation.173 Beyond the
considerable discrepancy between the amount used to fund Kendra’s Law
and the amount estimated to institute the 2004 reforms, the workload cost
was described as the most detrimental in the 2000 Commission on Fairness
Report, which stated that more training on mental health issues was needed
and more thorough efforts by those representing and involuntarily
committing patients needed to be provided to both protect the patient and the
state’s interests.174 Judge Mel Grossman from the Seventeenth Circuit
pointed to the fact that the legislation entitled patients to resources that the
State did not currently have.175 “[T]he statute talks about entitlements to
guardian advocates. In most areas of the state, there are very few people.
[You are] talking about people committing to multi-year supervision,
because mental illness is not something that is cured overnight. I think there
will be some difficulty there.”176 President of the Florida Public Defender
Association, Nancy Daniels, stated that the new legislation would very likely
“bring a lot of new cases into the system.”177
A major problem that Kendra’s Law faced in New York, and persists
as a major concern in Florida, is that the mentally ill will become
incarcerated, homeless, and loiter in public spaces.178 Laws focused on
168.
Pudlow, supra note 151.
169.
Id.
170.
Id.
171.
Fla. H.R. Comm. on Mental Health, HB 463 (2004) Staff Analysis 14.
172.
Id.; see also South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, supra note 119.
173.
See South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, supra note 119.
174.
See Fla. H.R. Comm. on Mental Health, HB 463 (2004) Staff Analysis 12;
Killian, supra note 119; South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, supra note 119.
175.
Pudlow, supra note 151.
176.
Id.
177.
Id.
178.
See id.; Watnik, supra note 55, at 1186–87.
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deinstitutionalizing mental health, such as Kendra’s Law, moved away from
traditional notions of mental illness treatment that institutionalized patients in
hospitals where they received structured, guided, and controlled care.179
Kendra’s Law was a move towards deinstitutionalization of mental health
treatment for patients.180 The move to deinstitutionalize allowed patients to
gain liberty in exchange for treatment.181 However, those who are
imminently at danger often qualify for outpatient treatment until an actual
danger, risk, or harm occurs.182 While patients gain their liberty and freedom
through this process, the discharge of thousands of mentally ill patients from
psychiatric hospitals, without providing a means to ensure that those same
patients receive and take the medications they need to stay healthy, creates a
crisis produced by deinstitutionalization.183
One major contribution to the predicted workload increase was a
new requirement that all Baker Act cases be reviewed every six months,
making for heavy traffic within the court system without any resources or
means to meet the excess demands on the court system. 184 Predicting these
difficulties, a prosecutor and chair for the House Appropriations Committee,
Republican Bruce Kyle put in an amendment that funds would be provided
to “state attorneys and public defenders” to assuage the predicted increase
workload.185 However, the amendment was later taken off, before the bill
was actually passed in the House by final vote 100 to 15.186 Ultimately, the
bill was passed and predictions were that hearings would double or even
triple, yet few resources were offered by politicians to alleviate
implementing laws through practical procedures.187 Judge Grossman stated
the frustration felt by many: “They gave us no money to go with this. They
[did not] give us any new judges. It is an unfunded mandate.”188

179.
See Pudlow, supra note 151; South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board,
supra note 119; E. Fuller Torrey & Mary Zdanowicz, Why Deinstitutionalization Turned
Deadly, WALL ST. J. (N.Y.), Aug. 4, 1998, at A18.
180.
See South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, supra note 119.
181.
Watnik, supra note 55, at 1185–86; see also TORREY, supra note 145, at 8,
10.
182.
See Watnik, supra note 55, at 1187 n.29; Torrey & Zdanowicz, supra note
179.
183.
See Torrey & Zdanowicz, supra note 179.
184.
Pudlow, supra note 151.
185.
See id.
186.
Id.
187.
Id.
188.
Id.
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C.
The Curious Case of Cindy Mertz: Abuses Recalling Back to
Florida’s Mental Health System Pre-Baker Act Still Exist
A systematic upheaval, the deinstitutionalization of a system, and a
revolving door of reforms have not rid Florida’s Mental Health System of the
abuses and problems that the Baker Act promised and aimed to resolve since
1971.189 The case of Cindy Mertz is one case that typifies this abuse.190
Mertz was an intellectually disabled twenty-one-year-old who was held
under the Baker Act in 2015.191 She was a child of abuse, placed into the
foster system, and eventually adopted by a family in 2008.192 Against the
wishes of her adopted family who became her legal guardians, Mertz was
locked into North Tampa Behavioral Health Hospital instead of the statefunded group home where staff and her family had placed her originally.193
North Tampa Behavioral Health is owned by Acadia Healthcare—a
conglomerate that runs 225 health facilities in thirty-seven states.194 North
Tampa Behavior Health came into trouble, only a year earlier, when a
woman admitted herself into the hospital voluntarily and was then refused
release.195 The hospital was also criticized in 2014 for not ensuring that
patients were competent to consent when admitting themselves pursuant to
what the Baker Act laws in Florida require.196 At the time the article was
printed, August 18, 2015, Mertz had been locked up for three weeks in the
North Tampa Behavioral Health Hospital, well beyond the seventy-two hour
hold prescribed by the Baker Act.197 Nikki Drake, a board member of the
National Association for Mental Illness, wrote an email to hospital staff on
August 13, 2015, asking what needed to be done in order for Mertz to leave
the hospital.198 She stated in the email, “[s]he can[not] live there. You
[cannot] cure her developmental disability.”199 Two days after the original
article was published in the Miami Herald, Mertz was sent back to her group

189.
See FLA. STAT. § 394.467(1) (2016); Bianchi, supra note 41, at 102–04,
113, 117–19; Editorial, Baker Act Is Inadequate and Overused, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Nov. 8,
2015, at F4; Miller, supra note 128.
190.
See Miller, supra note 128.
191.
Id.
192.
Id.
193.
Id.
194.
Id.
195.
Miller, supra note 128.
196.
Id.
197.
Id.
198.
Id.
199.
Id.
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home.200 The original arguments for keeping her in the hospital no longer
appeared to apply as reasons for keeping her in the facility.201
Mertz’s case is not unique, and it is possible under the Baker Act to
be taken against one’s will legally.202 Richard Smith’s seven-year-old son
was involuntarily committed into a mental institution by officers and school
officials when he threw a temper-tantrum in his second-grade class.203 After
reporting to the boy’s elementary school, seeing a classroom torn apart,
hearing he stepped on a teacher’s foot, and battered another school official,
the officers decided that the boy needed to be evaluated for his mental
health.204 While school officials and officers believe that their decision to
have the boy involuntarily committed under the Baker Act was valid, other
legal officials, and the boy’s parents, believe that this was an abuse of the
mental health system, given that the most harm caused was stepping on a
teacher’s foot.205 In Pinellas County alone, in the school year of 2008 to
2009, between August and early February, the Pinellas School Police
reported that it Baker Acted eighty-three children within its system alone.206
III.

REFORM FAILURE WITHIN FLORIDA’S BAKER ACT SYSTEM AND THE
CAUSES OF SYSTEMIC ABUSE

The numerous allegations of abuse and the general overbreadth of
those alleged abuses have many causes.207 The 2004 reforms were instituted
as a humane measure that would prevent the mentally ill from hurting
200.
Carol Marbin Miller, Woman Locked in Florida Mental Hospital Released
to Her Group Home, MIAMI HERALD: FLA. (Aug. 20, 2015, 11:56 AM),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/state/florida/article31620170.html.
201.
See id.; Miller, supra note 128.
202.
See FLA. STAT. § 394.467 (2016); Abel, supra note 128.
203.
Abel, supra note 128.
204.
Id.
205.
See id.
206.
Id. (comparing this number to the fact that the figure of eighty-three
children, in less than six months, excludes all other legal agencies in the area and is specific to
the Pinellas School Police Force); see also Laura C. Morel, Numbers Show Surge in Baker Act
Exams of Kids in Tampa Bay Area, TAMPA BAY TIMES: NEWS (Dec. 19, 2016, 10:55 AM),
http://www.tampabay.com/news/publicsafety/numbers-show-surge-in-baker-act-exams-ofkids-in-tampa-bay-area/2306799 (referring to the fact that children are being committed
involuntarily by the school system and parents because there is no oversight of the initial
commitment by the court system and patient/minor child confidentiality prevents further
investigation into the matter).
207.
Florida Supreme Court Justices Ask for More Judges, SUN-SENTINEL
(Dec. 15, 2016, 1:52 PM), http://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/politics/fl-more-judges-needed20161215-story.html; see also Miller, supra note 128; Editorial, supra note 189; Associated
Press, Involuntary Health Commitments Surge in Minors, HEALTH NEWS FLA. (Dec. 20, 2016),
http://www.health.wusf.usf.edu/post/involuntary-mental-health-commitments-surge-minors.
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themselves or others.208 Yet, a Times-Union editorial declared—as recent as
November 2015—the 2004 reforms had not solved the problems they set out
to resolve.209
A.
Misuse and Abuse of the Baker Act System: Ever-Increasing
Involuntary Commitments
From 2004 to 2015, involuntary commitments in Florida increased
by 64%.210 The Times-Union reported that involuntary commitments were
often misused and abused.211 The article referenced reported Baker Act
hospitalizations by schools and parents who cannot or will not care for their
difficult children.212 Meanwhile, the frail, elderly population—who suffer
from dementia and act out as a symptom of the disease or other illnesses—
are also often Baker Acted213 rather than placed where their needs would be
better addressed.214 While mental health advocates applauded the Baker Act
in the 1970s, they are now concerned with the Baker Act being a dumping
ground used to commit and institutionalize individuals when the system has
nowhere else to place them.215
Continuous increases in involuntary commitments also reflect mental
health advocates’ concerns regarding the validity of research used to promote
the status-quo and subdue the call for more reforms of the current Baker Act
system.216 While Baker Act patients are in contact with substance abuse
services, mental health advocates question the validity of that research and
state real concerns about a missing connection or coordination between
those Baker Acted and substance abuse services.217 This problem becomes
compounded in situations where the mentally ill are homeless or without
resources and help once released.218 Once released, the revolving door

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

See Editorial, supra note 189.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Miller, supra note 128; see also Voices on Baker Act Reform, TREATMENT
ADVOC.
CTR.,
http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/voices_on_baker_act_reform.pdf
(last visited Dec. 31, 2017). It is generally understood and accepted that if someone is Baker
Acted, he or she has been involuntarily committed under the Baker Act. Voices on Baker Act
Reform, supra.
214.
See Editorial, supra note 189.
215.
Id.
216.
See id.
217.
Id.
218.
Id.
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becomes almost inevitable as patients leave with only pills, a prescription,
and no easy access to continued mental health care.219
The Baker Act Reporting Center reported that thirty-one mental
health patients were Baker Acted sixteen or more times in one year alone.220
From 2004 to 2013, close to 350 patients were involuntarily committed over
thirty-six times or more.221 This problem worsened when each institution
and the bodies of professionals who were required to act in involuntary civil
commitments acted independently and disjointedly.222 The Times-Union
Editorial Board opined and warned that these issues were a product of a
broken system and an obvious result of legislators passing reforms without
providing the necessary funding to enact the reforms.223 Florida ranks fortyninth out of fifty states regarding the amount of money it spends on mental
health.224 Annette Christy, who was in charge of Florida’s Baker Act
Reporting Center in 2015, stated that there was a need for funds and that,
unfortunately, tragedy appears to be one of the few triggers that will
stimulate the funds needed.225
B.
Competing Authorities and Interests: Who Prevails? How Can
Information Be Communicated to Meet the Needs of the Patient and
Competing Authorities?
W.M. v. State226 established that multiple divisions and courts
representing the State can have concurrent jurisdiction overseeing the
involuntary inpatient placement hearings of patients involuntarily
committed.227 This can result in what is seen in the W.M. case: A patient
can be committed for a short period of time and then be mandated by a
facility administrator to stay a longer term than the circuit court’s initial
determination.228 The facility administrator only needed to determine the
patient was incompetent to act on his or her own behalf.229 Further, given the
confidential nature of the patients and separate oaths of confidentiality
between the patient, psychiatrists, lawyers, guardians, and mental health
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
supra note 128.
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Editorial, supra note 189.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Editorial, supra note 189.
Id.
992 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
Id. at 384, 388.
Id. at 384–86.
FLA. STAT. § 394.467(1)–(2) (2016); W.M., 992 So. 2d at 384; Miller,
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advocates, necessary oversight over each patient, case, the facilities, and
treatment becomes almost impossible without inherently violating a patient’s
right to privacy.230
Referring back to the case of the Cindy Mertz, a major cause of her
alleged kidnapping resulted from competing authorities, interests, and an
inability to communicate clearly.231 Communication between judges, mental
health advocates, and the hospital was not handled in-person and primarily
done through varying forms of technology—either email or the phone.232
These technological communications prevented immediate actions from
being taken, and allowed for delays, as the allegations of Mertz’s advocates
and guardian—based primarily on their communications over phone and
email with hospital staff and Mertz—were weighed against the alleged
observations of hospital staff and administrators.233 The Miami Herald
reported, “[l]ong email threads among Drake, [Mertz’s advocate], Mertz’s
guardian, her behavior analyst, and hospital staffers beg[a]n on Aug[ust]
[third], and bec[a]me increasingly frantic.”234 J. Rob Phillips, the Director of
Clinical Services at North Tampa Behavioral Health, validated the hospital’s
decision to keep the developmentally impaired woman in the hospital by
stating in an email that Mertz had shown “suicidal ideation[s] and suicidal
gestures” and that it would be sending Mertz to court to keep her in its
facility.235 Meanwhile, Drake wrote back that the woman was not psychotic
and, when he spoke to her over the phone, she sounded over-medicated
causing her speech to be severely slurred.236 Access to the patient was
regulated by the hospital, and the patient’s access to the court was dependent
upon the facility or hospital where they are admitted.237 This holds true until
the patient is deemed by a judge to have met the criteria for release, and he or
she is released by the judge from the facility’s control.238

230.
See Miller, supra note 128 (discussing how doctors referred to the
patient’s confidentiality as a reason why they would not be able to provide more reasons as to
why they were not releasing Mertz as requested).
231.
See id.
232.
See id.
233.
See id.
234.
Id.
235.
Miller, supra note 128.
236.
Id.
237.
Id.
238.
FLA. STAT. § 394.467(7)(d) (2016); Miller, supra note 128.
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DOE V. STATE: DOES TELECONFERENCING BAKER ACT HEARINGS
PROVIDE A NECESSARY REMEDY OR VIOLATE AN INDIVIDUAL’S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS?

Video technology developed and advanced at the same time that
Florida’s judiciary confronted many financial limitations.239 Budget cuts
forced courts and the judiciary to create new and efficient ways to meet the
rigorous demands of their judicial obligations, and ultimately led to an
inquiry into how technology could be used for efficient and effective
change.240 Statutory prohibitions and rule-based prohibitions do not exist
regarding the use of videoconferencing during Baker Act proceedings.241 At
the time that the Supreme Court of Florida considered this case, case law did
not exist stating that Baker Act hearings by videoconferences were
prohibited by the Constitution.242
On March 30, 2016, two seemingly innocuous email lines began a
firestorm of legal debate, questioning the procedural validity,
constitutionality, decision-making, and duties of judges with regard to using
videoconferencing during Baker Act Hearings.243 As part of her daily
routine, Judicial Assistant for the Honorable Judge Swett, Kate Hroncich,
sent an email to Public Defender Kathleen Smith with the subject of Baker
Acts on Friday.244 The email stated: “Per Judge Swett, he will be doing
Baker Acts beginning this Friday via Polycom. Thank you.”245
These two lines began a legal battle between mental health officials,
attorneys for the mentally ill, and trial judges who presided over Baker Act
hearings.246 The debate would highlight the problematic procedural structure
of the Baker Act, showcase how the mentally ills’ due process rights can be
easily violated, re-emphasize the importance and need for reform, and
underscore the continued lack of effective reform. 247 Beyond whether the
judge’s email violated an established legal procedure, petitioners questioned
whether the patients’ constitutional and due process rights were violated as a
result of this procedure.248
239.
Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at 20.
240.
Id.
241.
Id. at 2.
242.
Id.
243.
See Doe v. State, 217 So. 3d 1020, 1023 (Fla. 2017); Petitioners’ Initial
Brief at 5–6, Doe v. State, 217 So. 3d 1020 (Fla. 2017) (No. SC16-1852).
244.
Petitioners’ Initial Brief, supra note 243, at 5.
245.
Doe, 217 So. 3d at 1023; Petitioners’ Initial Brief, supra note 243, at 5.
246.
See Doe, 217 So. 3d at 1023.
247.
See id. at 1022; infra Part IV (A)–(C).
248.
Petitioners’ Initial Brief, supra note 243, at 1–2, 15.
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A.
The Practical and Procedural Costs of the 2004 Baker Act Reforms:
Insufficient Resources and the Advent of Teleconferencing for Baker Act
Hearings
In order to understand the significance of Doe, the historical and
legal context of the judges’ plight must be understood and considered.249
Despite the legislature passing Baker Act reforms in 2004, the Florida
Legislature had not added circuit or county judgeships in ten years to support
the enactment of those reforms.250 Only in 2016, were twelve new
judgeships recommended and announced by the Supreme Court of Florida.251
Yet, these recommendations came ten years behind schedule as reforms from
2004 increased judges’ workloads regarding Baker Act hearings.252 From
2010 until 2015 alone, some counties reported a 50% or more increase in
Baker Act evidentiary hearings for minors alone.253 With no new judgeships
added, judges were required to meet the needs of these patients and conduct
the hearings at the courthouse or at patients’ facilities.254 When judges
commuted to patient facilities, they would often have to wait as patients met
with their attorneys.255 Wait time and time lost in travel backed up the
hearing schedule in an already bogged down system.256 Costs accumulated
as a result of the travel and wait time incurred by judges traveling from
facility to facility.257 Yet, the travel and wait time was not limited to
judges—all legal and medical authorities involved in the case were also
required to attend the hearings, imparting more fees on the state through the
presence and appearance of state, medical, and law enforcement officials. 258
249.
See Florida Supreme Court Justices Ask for More Judges, supra note 207
(discussing how Florida lawmakers have not added judgeships in a decade and how
judgeships have been impacted by heavy burdens on the state’s fiscal health because of crises
such as the mortgage crisis).
250.
See Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at 13; Fla. S. Comm. on Child., Fams. & Elder
Aff., 2004 Regular Session: Summary of Legislation Passed 83 (2004), available at
http://archive.flsenate.gov/publications/2004/senate/reports/summaries/pdf/sessum04.pdf;
Florida Supreme Court Justices Ask for More Judges, supra note 207.
251.
Florida Supreme Court Justices Ask for More Judges, supra note 207.
252.
See Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at 13; Florida Supreme Court Justices Ask for
More Judges, supra note 207; Morel, supra note 206.
253.
Morel, supra note 206.
254.
Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at 13–15.
255.
Id. at 14 n.15.
256.
See id. at 14.
257.
Id. at 14–15.
258.
See id.
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Meanwhile, judges would argue that the courthouse did not provide patients
with a proper and safe setting to hold Baker Act evidentiary hearings.259
Patients traveled to locations that were unfamiliar to them and followed strict
protocols that were usually used to control “criminals or those accused of
crime[s].”260 “The Baker Act [mandates] that the patients’ individual
digniti[es] [be upheld and] respected at all times,” and these procedures were
in direct opposition of that humane mandate.261 Holding cells were the only
location where patients involuntarily committed could wait for their
evidentiary hearings as no private or secure holding areas existed for
patients.262 Meanwhile, placing patients in open and public areas caused a
new host of problems as the patient presumably was involuntarily committed
because he or she posed a danger either to himself or herself or the public.263
By placing him or her in an open and public place, the respondent judges
argued that this could cause the patient more harm and expose the public to
unnecessary risks within the courthouse.264
Further, medical facilities become responsible for relocating the
patients to the courthouse, causing the state to incur more costs.265
“[T]ransport service employees [would] not [necessarily] be law
enforcement” officers properly trained to handle the risks of transporting
such vulnerable patients.266 Escapes, medical emergencies, risk to the
transport service employees, and increased costs to the state would all be the
basis of the judge’s reasoning that teleconferences were appropriate and
applicable to Baker Act hearings and could substitute the statutory in-person
hearings held at the courthouse.267
B.
Doe v. State: Petitioners Argue Baker Act Hearings Via
Teleconferences Are a Violation of Patients’ Rights
The issue at the heart of Doe was whether a judicial officer should be
required to be physically present with the petitioners when Baker Act
hearings were held—either by law or legal duty.268 The case was initiated
259.
Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at 15–16.
260.
Id. at 15 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 394.459(1) (2016)).
261.
Id.
262.
See id. at 15–16.
263.
Id. at 16.
264.
See Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at 16.
265.
Id. at 14–15.
266.
Id. at 16.
267.
See id. at 14–17, 20.
268.
Doe v. State, 217 So. 3d 1020, 1022–23 (Fla. 2017).
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and filed with the Second District by fifteen petitioners, including John Doe,
seeking relief from a seemingly off-the-cuff and without notice decision
made by Judge Swett in Lee County that declared all involuntary
commitment hearings would be held remotely.269 The Second District
questioned the judgment of holding these hearings remotely, but held that
conducting Baker Act hearings through teleconferences were “within the
discretion of the court.”270 The Baker Act did not establish that judicial
officers had a ministerial or indisputable legal duty to be physically present
when they “presid[ed] over involuntary inpatient placement hearings.”271
The majority of the district court panel reviewing the briefs submitted by
both parties concluded that there was no “express legal right to have the
judicial officer be physically present with the petitioners” during Baker Act
hearings, and that no legal duty was outright expressed.272 However, they
did determine the law clearly established that necessary mandamus relief
“can derive from a variety of legal sources, including . . . rules of court.”273
Judge Wallace wrote a concurring opinion with the majority where
he expressed concerns about the law as it stood.274 The Second District did
state that despite there being no express legal right to have a judge physically
preside over Baker Act hearings, two problems did exist in the proceedings
of the trial court: (1) a court order supporting the judge’s arguments was not
provided; and (2) the trial judge did not provide a reason for his decision to
preside over involuntary placement hearings over teleconference.275 Even
still, Wallace wrote in this opinion that while the majority held correctly,
“the manner in which the trial judges . . . exercised [their] authority” over
these hearings was unwarranted, inappropriate, and ill-advised.276 Despite
his concurring opinion, Judge Wallace stated three reasons why conducting
Baker Act hearings through teleconferencing equipment was questionable:
(1) potential difficulties such as equipment malfunctioning and counsel not
being able to approach the bench to speak in private; (2) the Supreme Court
of Florida appointed a subcommittee on this topic in 1997, and the circuit
court was disregarding the opinion of the subcommittee by continuing to
269.
Id. at 1023.
270.
Id.
271.
Id.
272.
Doe v. State, 210 So. 3d 154, 157 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2016), rev’d, 217
So. 3d 1020 (Fla. 2017).
273.
Id. (quoting Nader v. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 87 So.
3d 712, 723 (Fla. 2012)). Established law does not have to only be defined by the legislature,
but can also be derived from rules of court, statutes, constitutional law, and controlling case
law. Nader, 87 So. 3d at 723.
274.
Doe, 210 So. 3d at 159.
275.
Id. at 160–62.
276.
Id. at 159.
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hold such hearings; and (3) similar procedures for juvenile hearings were
used before and ultimately failed.277
This begged the question of whether the silence by the legislature
was an oversight or purposely excluded.278 The question became whether the
silence on this procedure provided judges with a choice in how to handle
such hearings, or if it was an oversight and the legislature assumed that
longstanding traditions—always compelling the personal attendance of
judicial officers at the evidentiary hearings and trials of which they preside—
would prevail.279
Judge Lucas of the Second District Court of Appeal offered in his
dissent that while no law required the physical presence of a judge in express
terms,280 Bryant v. State281 established that the physical presence of a judge
was constitutionally mandated in a criminal trial, unless waived.282 The case
law held precedent that the physical presence of a judge was a bedrock
principle and the reason it was not expressly stated in the law was because
the physical presence of a judge or magistrate has always been a standard
assumed as an elemental component to preside over trials and evidentiary
hearings.283 The Baker Act hearings constitute evidentiary hearings; and as
277.
Id. at 163–65 (discussing Florida’s videoconferencing experiment with
juvenile detention hearings).
The Second District summarized the difficulties of
videoconferencing in juvenile proceedings by referring to the Amendment to Florida Rule of
Juvenile Procedure 8.100(A), which states:
Independent observations confirmed the fears expressed by all who have strongly
and continuously opposed the adoption of the proposed robotic procedure.
Specifically, many observed that there was no proper opportunity for meaningful,
private communications between the child and the parents or guardians, between
the parents or guardians and the public defender at the detention center, and
between a public defender at the detention center and a public defender in the
courtroom. The mechanical process produced a proceeding where, on many
occasions, multiple parties would speak at once, adding to the confusion. At the
conclusion of far too many hearings, the child had no comprehension as to what
had occurred and was forced to ask the public defender whether he or she was
being released or detained. It was also problematic that the public defender at the
detention center often had no access to the child’s court file, and there was
absolutely no opportunity to approach the bench to discuss private matters or
anything that should not have been openly broadcast. Moreover, perhaps because it
was difficult for the children to see, hear, and understand what was taking place, the
youth did not behave as those participating in person in a courtroom; that is, the
hearings totally lacked the dignity, decorum, and respect one would anticipate in a
personal appearance before the court.

Id. at 165; Amendment to Fla. Rules of Juvenile Procedure 8.100(A), 796 So. 2d
470, 473 (Fla. 2001).
278.
See Doe, 210 So. 3d at 168.
279.
See id.
280.
Id. at 166–68.
281.
656 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 1995) (per curiam).
282.
Id. at 428–29.
283.
Doe, 217 So. 3d at 1024; see also Doe, 210 So. 3d at 168.
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such, Judge Lucas argued that these court proceedings must be followed
pursuant to the rules of evidence.284 Lucas argued that the advent and
expansion of teleconferencing does not authorize judges to violate their
duties as would otherwise be assigned.285 This was something implicitly
assumed by the judges and magistrates who chose to use the technology as a
substitute for their physical presence during evidentiary hearings.286
C.
Doe v. State: Judges Argue that Technology Is a Necessary Remedy
for Failed Baker Act Reforms and Increasingly Insurmountable Workloads
The respondents in the Doe case argued in their Amicus Brief before
the Supreme Court of Florida287 that the Supreme Court of Florida’s Task
Force on the Management of Cases Involving Complex Litigation Report
and Recommendations, published in 2008, stated that the Supreme Court of
Florida should promote all courts throughout Florida to use
videoconferencing when possible.288 The respondents pointed out in the
same report that attorneys and judges were encouraged by the Supreme Court
Task Force to use videoconferencing to resolve their cases more quickly.289
The respondents argued, referring back to Judge Lucas’s dissent, that
the Florida Rules of Evidence provided statutory authority that video
recordings could be used to provide substantial testimonial evidence and
witness statements.290 Important court appearances, such as criminal
arraignments and first appearances, are often made by employing the use of
technology.291 Medical experts testify using videoconferencing technologies
during trial proceedings, and children testify during trial proceedings through
videoconference calls in order to avoid trauma pursuant to Florida Statute
section 92.55.292 Much in the same way that children need protecting, the
judges argue in their Amicus Brief that the Baker Act provided several
protections for the mentally ill and none were impeded upon by the use of
284.
Doe, 210 So. 3d at 168.
285.
Doe, 217 So. 3d at 1027; see also Doe, 210 So. 3d at 168–69.
286.
Doe, 210 So. 3d at 168; see also Doe, 217 So. 3d at 1027.
287.
Answer Brief of Respondent at 10–11, Doe v. State, 217 So. 3d 1020 (Fla.
2017) (No. SC16-1852); see also Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at 2.
288.
See Answer Brief of Respondent, supra note 287, at 10–11.
289.
See id. at 10.
290.
Id. at 12 (citing Kelley v. Webb, 676 So. 2d 538, 539 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1996)); see also Doe v. State, 210 So. 3d 154, 168 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (Lucas
J., dissenting), rev’d, 217 So. 3d 1020 (Fla. 2017).
291.
Answer Brief of Respondent, supra note 287, at 12.
292.
See FLA. STAT. § 92.55 (2016); Answer Brief of Respondent, supra note
287, at 12.
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teleconferencing.293
While the petitioners argued that the use of
videoconferencing technology during involuntary commitment procedures
infringes upon the due process rights of the mentally ill, the respondents
quoted the holding of M.W. v. Davis.294 M.W. held that while the purpose of
due process in substantive due process claims was to protect the fair
treatment of individuals by using proper administrative justice, the purpose
and validity of due process claims in procedural due process depended on the
nature of the court proceeding.295
The Chief Judge Jeffrey Colbath of the Fifteenth District wrote an
Amicus Brief citing that the Florida Legislature had not added or created
new county or circuit judgeships in a decade but expected the reforms to be
enacted.296 In his brief, he described the specific struggles of judges in Palm
Beach County who comprised the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit.297 The struggles
derived from the expanse of the county and the lack of judges and time
needed to cover the area; the county is sixty-miles-long and forty-mileswide, with seven mental health facilities all serviced by only four magistrates
who would travel to attend the Baker Act hearings.298 The public defender,
the state attorney, the sheriff deputy, and the judicial officer would all travel
to each facility housing patients where they would preside over each of these
hearings.299 The Chief Judge argued that time and resources lost were a
waste as these hearings could be easily performed over teleconference.300
The Chief Judge also referred to cost concerns related to Baker Act
proceedings.301 Travel-related costs would no longer be incurred by the
judicial officer or the sheriff deputy’s office.302 The state attorney and the
public defender’s offices would also save these travel costs.303 Furthermore,
the facilities would also avoid the travel costs of transporting the patient
between the facility and courthouse.304

293.
See FLA. STAT. § 92.55; Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial
Circuit as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at 2–3, 20.
294.
756 So. 2d 90, 92 (Fla. 2000); see also Answer Brief of Respondent,
supra note 287, at 14.
295.
M.W., 756 So. 2d at 97.
296.
See Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at 13.
297.
Id. at 14.
298.
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299.
See id.
300.
Id.
301.
Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at 14.
302.
Id.
303.
See id. at 14–15.
304.
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The security of the patient and the public is also cited in the Chief
Justice’s Amicus Brief.305 Specifically, the judge wrote that the courthouses
were not well equipped to hold Baker Act hearings because patients could
only be held in criminal holding cells.306 He argued that the Baker Act states
in plain language that holding cells should not be used and avoided for Baker
Act hearings.307 Holding a Baker Act patient in an open waiting area, who
has been involuntarily committed because he or she is deemed either a
danger to themselves or others, is an equally disconcerting idea as it would
expose the public to a known and unnecessary risk.308 Security protocols are
not as easily controlled when a Baker Act hearing is held within the
courthouse, given the environment cannot be completely controlled by the
security provided by the facility.309
D.
The Supreme Court’s Final Decision on Doe v. State:
Teleconferences are Unconstitutional
The Supreme Court of Florida in the Doe case ultimately held that
the lack of resources and the struggles that the judges described did not
outweigh the individuals’ constitutional rights to due process and liberty.310
The expediency and problems with workload did not provide sufficient
reason to validate holding Baker Act hearings by teleconference.311 The
Supreme Court of Florida stated that in Baker Act hearings, unlike in
criminal proceedings, the use of teleconference technology is not expressly
sanctioned against by the statute.312 However, the Court did take issue with
the way the judge incorrectly used his authority to determine that he would
only preside over Baker Act hearings through teleconference technology. 313
The Supreme Court of Florida described Judge Swett’s actions as misguided
wisdom and an overreach of authority.314 His decision did not meet the
standards intended by the legislature that allows judges to use their discretion
as to where and how to hold Baker Act hearings.315 Longstanding traditions
require that judicial officers be present at trials and the advent of technology
305.
Id. at 15.
306.
Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at 15.
307.
Id. at 15.
308.
Id. at 16.
309.
See id.
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Doe v. State, 217 So. 3d 1020, 1026 (Fla. 2017).
311.
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312.
Id. at 1025, 1028.
313.
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Id. at 1031–32.
315.
See Doe, 217 So. 3d at 1023–25.
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does not change this tradition, nor is it a reason to change this tradition, nor
should it be assumed to change this tradition.316 The Supreme Court of
Florida wrote that the legislature’s intent regarding how and where to hold
Baker Act hearings was to benefit the patient only, and ultimately depended
upon what was least injurious to the patient’s condition.317 With the patient’s
conditions in mind, judges could use their discretion as to whether Baker Act
hearings should be held in the courthouse or at the mental health facility. 318
The final conclusion regarding the respondents’ practical and logistical
concerns was that judicial expediency never justifies the exercise of a judge’s
discretion regarding Baker Act hearings.319
V.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The arguments made in the Amicus Brief of Chief Judge Jeff
Colbath, while found to be insufficient to validate Baker Act hearings being
teleconferenced, reflect a larger problem with the mental health system in
Florida.320 Deinstitutionalization has created a mental health funding crisis
with consistent decreases in funding provided to state-run treatment over the
last three decades.321 In fact, after 2008, states were obligated to cut over $4
billion in mental health spending, equating to the greatest decrease in
spending and funding for mental health since deinstitutionalization began.322
In 2004, seemingly needed calls for reform took place and many were
applied, but without the proper funding to support those reforms.323 The lack
of funding allotted to implement these reforms and the decrease in federal
funding that justified the move towards deinstitutionalization left mental
health facilities to find means—sometimes described as abuses—to pay for
the treatments they were meant to provide.324 As recent as 2015, Governor
Rick Scott proposed an increase of $19 million for mental health treatment,
which ultimately was passed as a split between mental health and drug

316.
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See Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus
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treatment to be released over two years.325 This amount, while seemingly
large, is dwarfed by the $150 million used by the New York Legislature to
implement Kendra’s Law for its first five years in the 1990s.326
With the proper funding, more licensed professionals could provide
care and services, and the services could be more effective.327 Without the
proper funding, the mental health system in Florida, and those who must
orchestrate and provide Baker Act services, will be consistently providing
the same services to patients who consistently return to treatment, and will
become overworked because they work in an inefficient and, possibly,
dangerous system—due to patients not receiving treatment in time, or acting
without medicine, or simply living in constant threats of lawsuits.328
Meanwhile, patients will continue to be misdiagnosed, mistreated, held
against their will without due process, negated liberty, and held without
treatment until the system can provide them with their court appearance. 329
Patients may even be incarcerated—for acts they commit while being
improperly treated or misdiagnosed—by an underfunded and ineffective
system.330 In the past, reforms were consistently made without sufficient and
proper funding provided, which has created our present mental health care
crisis.331 When funds were allotted, they were minimal and token amounts,
unable to achieve the lofty humanitarian notions the Baker Act and its
reforms strived to achieve.332
The Supreme Court of Florida questioned the wisdom of the judges’
use of technology and their justifications for its use in Baker Act hearings in
Doe.333 Yet, the Amicus Brief was not an attempt to abscond from the
official duties of Baker Act hearings, but rather a diligent attempt to deal
325.
Margie Menzel, Mental Health, Substance Abuse Reforms Get Approval,
HEALTH NEWS FLA. (Mar. 14, 2016), http://www.health.wusf.usf.edu/post/mental-healthsubstance-abuse-reforms-get-approval/; Margie Menzel, State Leaders Look to Improve
Mental-Health Funding, Policy, CBS MIAMI (Dec. 7, 2015, 9:41 PM),
http://miami.cbslocal.com/2015/12/07/state-leaders-look-to-improve-mental-health-fundingpolicy/.
326.
See South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, supra note 119.
327.
See South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, supra note 119
(explaining that as early as 2004, calls for reform were made to make the powers of the court
more explicit). Periods of patient observations needed to be extended beyond the standard
fifteen minutes prescribed, and even with these two changes, major reductions in recidivism
and mental illness turning into crime were expected. Id.
328.
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329.
See Gilliam, supra note 141; Killian, supra note 119; Torrey &
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332.
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333.
Doe v. State, 217 So. 3d 1020, 1026 (Fla. 2017).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol42/iss1/6

36

Monde'jar: The Practical And Procedural Repercussions of Short-Sighted, Unde

2017]

THE PRACTICAL AND PROCEDURAL REPERCUSSIONS

175

with an overwhelming and ever-increasing problem given the documented
surge in involuntary commitments and too few professionals and officials
managing involuntary commitments under the Baker Act within Florida’s
Mental Health System.334 Reforms should be conceived and approved within
the limits of the funding provided—rather than minimal funding being
promised by legislature to provide token gifts of support to reforms that are
not achievable—otherwise, the increased pattern of incarcerating the
mentally ill will continue to cost the state more than if patients were to
receive proper treatment from the beginning.335
VI.

CONCLUSION

Given the most recent holding of the Supreme Court of Florida in the
Doe case, the Florida Legislature should begin to rethink their reactive and
token-funding approach to mental health.336 Proactive action needs to take
place regarding mental health, where feasible reforms are enacted and a
sufficient and healthy amount of funding is provided to ensure the success of
the reforms.337 Baker Act reforms have consistently been underfunded and a
response to crisis.338 The clear and convincing standard of dangerousness,
either to one’s self or to others, is another pitfall that must be overcome
because help is too often provided too little and too late.339 New legal
definitions and grounds need to be created that better distinguish individuals
who need involuntary commitments and those who solely just need mental
health treatment and support.340 The definition of dangerousness needs to be
expanded to include concerns about patients’ welfare, their ability to manage
themselves healthily regarding self-care and neglect, as well as ensure that
they are living in suitable living environments that promote mental health
and self-care.341 A system responding to repeated crises without funding has
created a system riddled with issues that make Florida’s Mental Health
System a complex knot that must be untied; concurrent jurisdictions,
disjointed action by competing authorities, a broken communication system,
a concern for patient privacy, and a concern for funding underfunded
hospitals all create a perfect storm where abuse threatens the patient’s liberty
334.
See Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at 1–2.
335.
See Gilliam, supra note 141; Pudlow, supra note 151.
336.
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337.
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340.
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at every turn and the fight between all competing and interested parties
ultimately affect the patient whose interest they all allegedly aim to
protect.342 These abuses do not begin in hospitals or courtrooms, but rather
have been created on Florida’s Senate floor.343 The State of Florida needs to
stop reacting to crisis and, instead, act to prevent crisis by putting real money
into these reforms.344

342.
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